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CALLEJA v. BALZAN: REFLECTIONS ON 
PUBLIC ORDER 
VINCENT A. DE GAETANO 
INTRODUCTION 
Some years ago Lord Denning wrote on the role of the police: 
In safeguar~ cu- freedrrs, the police play a vital role. Society for its de-
ferce needs a well-led, well-trained and well-disciplined force of police wtun 
it can trust: and era.gt1 of fum to be able to prevent crire before it ~ 
or if it does happen, to detect it and br~ the acct.red to justice. The police, 
of ca.rse, rrust oct prq:ierly. They rrust d:Jey the rules of right ccncU:t. 
They rrust not extort a:nfessirns by t!Teats or prani.ses. They rrust not search 
a rran's hcu5e withcut authcrity. They rrust not U'le m:re force than the 
occasim warrants. &rt, so krg as they oct1 lunrably and prq:ierly, all tuleSt 
citizens ~ Slwrt fum to the utterrra;t. 
Very often the line of demarcation between proper and improper police conduct 
is a very thin one indeed, requiring legal skill for its appreciation and judicial 
interpretation and application for the observance of proper conduct. Until 
recently, for instance, it was considered to be proper police conduct to release 
a detainee, for the purpose of safeguarding the rule against detention in excess 
of forty-eight hours, by simply allowing him to step outside his place of deten-
tion and re-arresting him after walking a few feet. The Court of Magistrates 
of Judicial Police has now set a higher and more exacting standard of police 
conduct by requiring "manifest and effective" release2. 
Or. Vincent A. De Gaetano LLD., Dip.Crim.(Cantab.) is Senicr ilimel for the RepJ-
blic, Attaney Qneral's Office, Malta. 
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r This paper seeks to highlight one other vast area characterised by considerable 
uncertainty as to what are the limits of proper police conduct and of police 
powers, namely that of the maintenance of public order. No attempt will 
be made to exhaust the subject: that would be presumptuous. The aim is simply 
to put forward some arguments. The paper is largely based on a lecture deli-
vered at the invitation of the Commissioner of Police to Gazetted Officers 
of the Malta Police Force on the 8th January 1981. The case Calleja v. Balzan3 
has been included in the title of this paper, and will be discussed at some length, 
for two reasons. In the first place, although issues of public order are not 
necessarily tied to situations of public meetings, processions, and public demon-
strations and manifestations, it is obvious that these situations often present 
a greater risk of concentrated public disorder. Secondly, the judgements in 
Calleja v. Balzan, that is the judgement of the court of first instance and that 
of the Constitutional Court, touch upon a number of legal principles which 
are of considerable importance in the context of any discussion on public order. 
MOSTA: lOTH AUGUST 1975 
Early in 197 5 the Government introduced in Parliament a Bill which, in effect, 
for the first time since the decree Tametsi of the Council of Trent was pub-
lished in Malta by Bishop Domenico Cubelles -- the exact date of publication 
is not certain t+ -- proposed a civil law for regulating marriage. The law of 
marriage has been a vexed question in Malta since the advent of British colonial 
rule 5. Although as early as 1831 the Colonial Government had expressed its 
intention to introduce a Marriage Act, nothing of the sort was ever done, the 
Governor, Sir Frederick Ponsonby, limiting himself to a proclamation punishing 
clandestine marriages6. From 18t+t+, when the problem of mixed marriages 
in Malta was mooted by the Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar, right down to 1898 
when Sigismondo Savona attempted to raise the issue of mixed marriages and 
the Tametsi decree in the Council of Government, the question of the law 
of marriage in Malta was a hotly debated political issue on which political 
parties and the clergy took side/. The issue reared its head again in the late 
nineteen fifties and early sixties8. So it was expected that the Marriage Bill 
of 197 5 would cause a storm of protests. 
In August of 1975 the people of Mosta decided to crown the titular painting 
of the Blessed Virgin, after obtaining the necessary approval from the Eccle-
l t+ 
siastical authorities. The ceremony was to be held in the open in the main 
square of Mesta and was to be preceded by a procession along the main street 
of the village. Church and civil dignitaries were to share a common platform 
during the ceremony and were also to participate in the procession. The Rev. 
Monsignor Philip Calleja and a number of people of like mind thought that 
the procession and the ensuing ceremony would provide a unique opportunity 
to express publicly their disapproval of the Jaw which had received the Presi-
dent's assent on the 5th August. Posters, in different colours, expressing dis-
approval and condemnation of the said Jaw were printed; these were distributed 
prior to the procession with instructions to hold them in such a way as to be 
clearly visible to the participants in the procession. 
Now, among the people responsible for maintaining law and order in Mesta 
on that day was Mr. Denis Balzan, then an Inspector of Police. He had been 
promoted from the ranks only a few months before. At one point while the 
procession was already moving along Eucharistic Congress Road on its way 
to the main square, Inspec tor Balzan was informed by a number of people, 
including the Archpriest of Mesta, that trouble might erupt as a result of Mgr. 
Calleja's poster protest; some people even approached Inspector Balzan threaten-
ing that unless he intervened to remove the posters they would take the Jaw 
into their hands. Inspec tor Balzan warned them not to do anything of the sort 
but to leave the matter to be dealt with by the police. Inspector Balzan, accom-
panied by a police sergeant, approached Mgr. Calleja (who by now had entered 
the main square at the end of the procession itself) and politely asked him 
to remove the posters (presumably the posters the Monsignor was holding and 
the posters held by those in the immediate vicinity) adding that that was not 
the appropriate occasion for a poster protest. The Monsignor refused. At 
that moment, a woman approached the Monsignor from behind, grabbed the 
poster he was holding, and threw it on the ground. Undaunted, Monsignor Cal-
leja obtained another poster. The Inspector this time ordered him to remove 
the poster. Mgr. Calleja again refused, whereupon the Inspector removed the 
poster from the hands of the Monsignor (the Monsignor, in his evidence, main-
tained that the Inspector "grabbed" the poster). Mgr. Calleja managed to get 
yet another poster. This time Inspec tor Balzan, no doubt exasperated at the 
behaviour of the reverend gentleman, threatened to arrest Mgr. Calleja. The 
Monsignor invited the Inspector to note down his particulars and arrest him. 
Meanwhile, however, the religious ceremony had commenced in the main square, 
so Mgr. Calleja folded the poster and placed it in his breviary, and the Inspector 
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r left. There was no further incident between the two. During the chanting 
of the Creed as well as at the very end of the ceremony many of those who 
had posters, including Mgr. Calleja, held them up high above their heads, but 
there were no incidents. The encounter between the Monsignor and the Inspec-
tor lasted from ten to fifteen minutes. It must be emphasized that throughout 
that encounter Inspector Balzan acted with due politeness and civility, a fact 
which was acknowledged both by the First Hall and by the Constitutional Court9: 
paragraph 8(c) of the First Schedule to the Malta Police Ordinance, 1961 10 
must have been foremost in Inspector Balzan's mind that day. 
Mgr. Calleja had apparently not had enough. He filed an application in the 
First Hall of the Civil Court alleging that the Inspector' s be haviour amounted 
to a violation and infringement of his fundamental rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Constitution, more precisely of the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by sections 41, 42 and 43 of the Constitution; later he restricted his claim 
to violation of section 42 11 , that is, violation of his freedom of expression. 
The relevant parts of this section are subsections I and 2. 
S.42(1): Except with his own cmsent or by way of paren1al discipline, oo persm 
sraJ.I be hirdered in the enjoyment of his freecbn of expressim, incltxlirg free-
d:rn to hold opinicns withJut interference, freecbn to receive ideas and infor-
mation withJut interfererre, freecbn to cx:mnnicate ideas and infcmation 
without interference (whether the ccrrmnication be to the p.blic generally 
or to any persm or class of perscns) and freecbn fran interference with his 
correspm:Jerce. 
If one were to stop at subsection I, it is clear that Inspector Balzan was inter-
fering with the Monsignor's freedom to communicate ideas and information 
(about the new law on marriage) to the participants in the procession and to 
those gathered in the main square of Mesta, if not to the public generally. 
The Monsignor was not prevented from expressing his ideas, but he was hin-
dered 12. It will be observed that in our Constitution freedom of expression 
embraces and connotes the broad freedom to communicate and is not restricted 
to mere freedom of speech. It is a freedom to which every person in Malta 
-- not only a Maltese citizen in Malta -- is entitled13, subject, however, to 
such possible limitations and restrictions as are authorised by s.46(7) of the 
Constit ution; but whereas a person is entitled to this freedom while in Malta, 
the reception and communication of "ideas and information" is not limited 
to the territory of Malta14 (article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is more explicit on this point: "Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
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the licensing of broadcasting, television and cinema enterprises", emphasis 
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added ). Interference with freedom of expression may be in the form of 
previous restraint or of post-expression consequences. 
American author: 
In the words of one 
It is vital to recqsnise at the outset that the freedan of expression extends 
not only to speed1 and press but also to areas of ardct laced or tinged 
with expression, su:h as trose of press, iF'°ly, petition, association, lawful 
pid<eting and otrer dffrmstrative protests. 
In a sense even the right to silence is a facet of the right to freedom of expres-
sion 17 It should also be noted that s.42(1) of rhe present Const itution seems 
to embrace a slightly wider concept of freedom of expression than the corres-
ponding s.14(1) of the 1961 Constitution. S.14(1) of the Malta (Cons ti tut ion) 
Order in Council, 1961 provided that "except with his own consent, no person 
shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to 
say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information 
without interference, and freedom from interference with his correspondence", 
emphasis added. However, in Borg Olivier et. v. Buttigieg the words "that 
is to say" were in effec t held by the Privy Counc il to mean "including1118• 
But subsection 2 of section 42 provides: 
S.42(2): NJthing cxntaired in or <k:ne t.rder the authxity of any law shall 
be held to be inccnsistent with or in contravention of Slbsection ( l) of this 
secticn to the extent that the law in questim rrakes provision --
(a) that is reasonably required --
(i) in the interests of referee, plblic safety, public orOO-, 
public morality or decercy or plblic health; or 
(ii) for the IJUlXlie of protecting the reputatims, rights 
and freecbn; of otrer persms, or the private lives of perscns 
cm::erned in legal proceedirgs, preventing the disclosu-e of infor-
mation received in cmfiderce, maintaining the authxity and 
indeperderce of the cnrts, protecting the privileges of Parlia-
m:nt, or regulating teleprrny, te!egrapiy, posts, wireless brood-
castirg, television or otrer ITe:lllS of carrnnicatim, p.blic exhibi-
tions or p.blic entertairrrents; or 
(b) that irrposes restrictions Lpm plblic officers and except 
so far as that provisim or, as the case may be, the thing ck:ne 
t.nder the authxity thereof is srown not to be reasonably justi-
fiable in a dEm:x:ratic society. 
All these limitations to the substantive right, taken together, amount to the 
"respect for the rights and freedoms of others" and respec t for "the public 
interest" mentioned in s.33 of the Constitution 19. 
So there are, as it were, three stages. First, it must be established, as a fact 
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r and independently of other juridical considerations, that there was an inter-20 
ference with freedom of expression or that there is or is likely to be such 
interference, for example, if a particular law were to be given effect. Secondly, 
by way of a substantive plea, it may be claimed that the interference was 
or is being effected or is planned in consequence or under the authority of 
a Jaw, which Jaw, or particular provision thereof, was "reasonably required 
in the interests of. .... public order", and therefore the interference itself was 
reasonably required in the interests of 21 public order. Thirdly, even though 
a law makes provision that is reasonably required in the interests of public 
order, that provision of law, or the thing done under the authority of that 
provision of law, may nevertheless be shown not to be reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society and therefore unconstitutional. If the provision of 
law is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society then, a fortiori, the 
thing done under the authority thereof would likewise not be reasonably justi-
fiable. 
PROCLAMATION III OF l 964 
Now, admittedly, it is difficult to imagine a law which makes prov1s10n that 
is reasonably required in the interests of public order but whic h at the same 
time is not reasonably justifiable in a democ ratic society. After all it is the 
court which is going to decide what is and what is not reasonable; the court 
is hardly likely to hold that a particular provision of law is reasonable in the 
context of public order but not reasonable against the yardstick of the require-
ments of a democratic society, as if the reasonable requirements of public 
order can be assessed in a vacuum and apart from the society in which the 
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maintenance of public orde r is sought Difficult to imagine it may be; totally 
inconceivable certainly it is not. Indeed, the legislator himself, in another 
section of the Constitution, has expressly specified one instance where, although 
a particular provision of law may be reasonably required in the interests of, 
among other things, public order, that provision must be regarded as not being 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic soc iety and therefore unconstitutional. 
S.43 deals with freedom of assembly and association. Subsection 3 of that 
section provides: 
S.43(3): For the pipa;e of this sectim, any i:rovJSKn in any law i:rchibitirg 
the holdirg of p.blic rreetirgs or demnstratkn:; in any ooe or more particular 
cities, towns, Slb..rU:; or villages shall be ~d to be a i:rovisim which is not 
reascnably justifiable in a derrrx:ratic society. 
18 
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By definition (s.126(1) of the Constitution) the word "law" includes "any instru-
ment having the force of law" and therefore includes regulations, notices 
or proclamations made in virtue of an enabling law. Thus, if for the sake 
of argument, the people of Luqa were in a state of agitation because of band 
club rivalries and the state of agitation were such that it would be reasonable 
in the interests of public order to prohibit all public meetings (whether open 
air or otherwise) and demonstrations in Luqa until the agitation subsided, 
any proclamation to this effect made by the President in terms of ss.19(2) 
Id b . . 124 l and 21 of the Public Meetings Ordinance wou e unconst1tut1ona -- un ess 
s.43(3) of the Constitution is to be interpreted as referring solely to a "law" 
prohibiting the holding of public meetings or demonstrations in any one or 
more particular c ities, towns, suburbs or villages for an indefinite period of 
time, an interpretation not warranted either by the wording of the subsection 
in question or of s.43 in general. If in order to deal with the threat to public 
order at Luqa the President were to prohibit all public meetings and demonstra-
tions all over Malta and Gozo, that proclamation would then be unconstitu-
tional for a different reason, namely that the prohibition in other localities 
would not be reasonably required in the interests of public order in those other 
localities. 
One such blanket prohibition was decreed by Proclamation III of 1964. On 
the insistence of the Police, the Governor prohibited "from the 16th day to 
the 24th day of September 1964, both days inc lusive, the holding of all public 
meetings in the Island of Malta and its Dependencies and of all demonstrations 
in any place open to the public in the Island of Malta and its Dependencies, 
other than suc h as form part of the off icial Independence Celebrat ions". 
The Proclamation was challenged in court as being ultra vires the enabling 
law and as being unconstitutionaJ25. The Constitutiona l Court held that the 
Proclamation was "intra vires" and that it did not infringe any fundamental 
right or freedom guaranteed by the 196 1 Constitution. In the context of public 
order, demonstrations, which by definition are a lways he ld in the open26, 
seem to pose greater problems than public mee tings. Under s.1 9( 1) of the 
Public Meetings Ordinance, the Police Commissioner may, with the approval 
of the Minister responsible for the Police, and for reasons of public order, 
prohibit the holding of any public meeting in respect of which notice has been 
given to him in terms of the Ordinance. Such a prohibition against t he holding 
of a specific public meeting would not fall fou l of subsection 3 of section 
43 of the Constitution. But no previous notice or permission is required for 
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the holding of a demonstration27• Short of a proclamation, therefore, the 
Commissioner of Police would have to order the dispersion of every demonstra-
tion in progress or about to commence in the streets or open spaces of Luqa 
in order to maintain public order among the agitated villagers28• 
A law that is reasonably required in the interests of public order in Malta 
1s prima facie reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. This equation, 
however, should not be applied a priori when what is being impugned or chaJJen-
ged as unconstitutional is not a provision of Jaw, but a thing or act done under 
the authority of a provision of Jaw. Moreover the equation cannot have any 
logical dpplication whatsoever when the thing or act is not even a thing or 
act done under the authority of a Jaw, as for exdmple was the Department 
of Health circular 42/62 in Borg Olivier et. v. Buttigieg29. A Jaw may make 
provision that is reasonably required in the interests of public order, but be-
cause that Jaw aJJows a certain margin of administrative disc retion in its 
application, the way that disc retion is used (that is the act or thing done under 
the authority of that Jaw) may not be reasona bly justifiable in a democratic 
society, that is, it would amount to an abuse of administrative discretion by 
the standards of a democratic society and therefore by the standards of the 
Constitution. In Il-PuJizija v. Ganni Camilleri et.30 the First HaJJ of Her 
Majesty's Civil Court held that 
... .ari<e kieku 1-Prci<Jarra ma kinetx Jigi, imra serrplici att tar-ran ez.ekuttiv, jibqa 
dejjem lI hija att Ji, salva 1-kwistjoni tal-validita' tagtna, tidier m:iglnula "taht jew 
skmd 1-awtcrita' tal-Jigi", u 1-Q:rti hija cbbligata tirresisti S-9..Jggerirrent Ji biex 
ic-cittadini jktnu jistgtu jirrµ.njaw att ''p.Jrportirg'' Ji sar taht Jigi jrid.J bilfors ~I 
jaw il-Jigi. [Bra ntux biss kmtrarju ghall-kliem cari tad-dispE.zzjonijiet sotto ez.ami 
imna jista' jkm faniti ta' tentativi s.µrtluwi ta' rrµ.njazzjoni ta' Jigijiet perfettarfflt 
tajbin kulJ darba. li xi ufficjal ta1-Gv52 jirfes rigiejn xi hcrl:l u jigi rrharrek t:ctit 
id-disµ:6izzjonijiet dwar il-'human rights''. 
Her Majesty's C onstitutional Court did not disagree with or challenge this 
33 statement . More recently, however, that same court -- now styled Consti-
tutional Court -- has held that 
... .biex att amninistrattiv, rraghTul in kcnfamita' ma' provvedirrent ta' Jigi, u kwindi 
awtcrizzat b'dik il-Jigi, jigi dikjarat rull u bla effett, ikktnsidrat fih imifsu, ghax 
jikser 1-artikolu 42 tal-Ka;tiruzzjoni, irid jigi wkoll necessarjarrmt dikjarat Ji J-prov-
veclirrent Ji jawtcrizza dak 1-att jikser 1-istess artikolu 42, ghax 1-illegalita' ta' J-
azzjoni amninistrattiva hija J-effett ta' J-irl<Cfilituzzjcnalita' tal-proweclirrent Jegis-
lattiv, Ji hija kawza; f'kaz tmJ dan, ghalheki<, kulJ azzjoni diretta ghall-i"rµ.njazzjoni 
ta' J-att amninistrattiv ma tistax f'dan il-kmtest tigi kkmsidrata isolatarrent u indipen-
denterrent mill-proweclirrent Jegislattiv li tahtu jkm sar dak J-istess att, ghax J-
illegalita' tal-att hija necessarjarrent il-kmsegwenza ta' 1-illegalita' tal-Jigi, b'mxl 
Ji biex tigi stabbilita wat-da trid tktn qabel giet stabbilita J-dTa. 34 
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The court went to considerable pains to emphasize that not every administra-
tive act purporting to be done under the authority of a law was exempt from 
challenge on the grounds of unconstitutionality: 
Biex azzjoni anninistrattiva, pero', allegatarrfflt rragtnuia in forza ta' ligi parti-
kolari tista' tigi dikjarata nulla u bla ebda effett bla ma tkun giet fl-istess hin irrpln-
jata 1-istess ligi (dejjem indiperdenterrent minn irrpunjazzjoni fLq bazi ta' diskrimin-
azzjoni) owjament jinhtieg li dik 1-azzjoni fiha mifisha tkun vizzjata, b'mod li allura 
ssir illegali u ma jkunx jista' jir@lad aktar li dik 1-azzjoni giet rragtnuia validarnent 
in kc.nformita' mal-ligi. 35 
It has been said that this judgement in practice rules out the possibility of 
judicial redress in most cases of violation of human rights 36• This criticism, 
however, does not seem totally justified. The Constitutional Court was limited 
in its judgement by the very facts of the case, and even more limited by appli-
cants' own submissions and by the judgement of the first court. Applicants 
maintained that the written order made by the Minister of Public Works in 
terms of s.13 of the Aesthetic Buildings Ordinance (Cap.135) ordering them 
to remove an electronic broadcaster from atop the Nationalist Party Club 
in Valletta violated their fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by ss.42 
and 46 of the Constitution. 5.13 its~lf of the Ordinance was never put in 
issue. Moreover applicants agreed that the order was made under the authority 
of the said s.13 and in conformity thereto. The first court held that the Minis-
ter's order (not the enabling s.13) was not reasonably required in the interests 
of public order f)ecause the purpose of the enabling Ordinance was not the 
preservation or maintenance of public order. And the first court stopped 
there. 5.46 was not considered. The question of whether the order was reason-
ably justifiable in a democratic society was not considered; nor was the ques-
tion considered of whether the (written) order was itself a "law". Hence the 
Constitutional Court: 
11-ligi in kwistjoni m'hijiex wahda minn dawk protetti fl-Ewwel Ske<Ja tal-Kostituzzjoni, 
imra b'dana kollu qatt ma giet in diskussjoni, u h.Jwa appena necessarju jir@lad 
li 1-Qrti tiddecidi biss dwar il-kwistjoni li jkollha q.rl:lierffia, fLq il-kawzali de<btti 
fit-talba li ssir q.rl:lierffia, u ghalhekk ma tistax tiddikjara ruII u bla effett dak li 
1-legalita' u 1-validita' tieghu ntuwiex in diskussjoni, jew inkella tiddikjara ruII xi 
att partikolari fLq kawzali ta' nullita' ta' xi haga dlra meta din il-kawzali ma tkunx 
giet de<btta. 37 
However in at least one case since Galea noe. et. v. 11-Kummissarju tal-Puli-
zija et. and Galea noe. et. v. Salvu Sant noe. were decided, the First Hall 
of the Civil Court appears to have refused to follow those judgements. In 
11-Pulizija v. Dr. Louis Galea et. 38 the court held: 
Fit-trattazzjoni orali, il-kafilent legali tal-Pulizija, issottaretta illi r-rifjut im;emni 
sar "skcnd 1-awtorita' ta' ligi" li ma gietx attakkata mill-irrµJtati bil-kmsegwenza 
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I Ii 1-irrputati rra jistghux jattakkaw ir-rifjut ga la dama rra kienux, qabel, jattakkaw il-ligi. Din is-sottanissjmi ni1ix legalrrent korretta; fil-felna tal-Q:rti, kull att, salv s'Imni 1-kwi<itjni 1al-valdta' o !TOD ~ jista' jigi attakkat mill-individwu Ji jinvci<a favur tieghu id-disposizzjcni tal-Artikolu 42 tal-Ka>tituzzjcni mirghajr il-
b:zcrri Ii 1-individwu jirrµ.nja wkoll il-ligi Ji t.ahtha u skcrotha dak 1-att jigi aUegat 
Ii sar ..• .altrirrenti jigri Ji att ta' xi ufficjal, arusiv kemn h.J arusiv, rra jktn jista' 
qatt jigi irrpmjat in focza tad-disposizzjcni Ii tiggarantixxi dan id-dritt ft.rdarrentali 
f'kaz Ii jigi allefpt Ii dak 1-att ikl.n sar ~ 1-awtcrita' ta' xi ligi, Ii wiehed ghandl 
jah5eb tkui, bhala regola, perfettarrent tajba (errpiasis adcE<l). 
It is submitted that on this point this judgement is in reality perfectly recon-
cileable with the two "electronic broadcaster" judgements and with previous 
case-law. The Police have appealed from the judgement and the case is now 
pending before the Constitutional Court. 
We must now turn back to Calleja v. Balzan. 
PRESERVING PUBLIC ORDER AND PEACE 
Before the First Ha ll of t he Civil Court respondent Ba lzan pleaded that he 
had only acted in e xecution of his duty to preserve public order 40. No serious 
attempt appears to have been made by respondent to plead subsec t ion 7 of 
sec tion 48 of the Constitution, namely that the provisions of the Criminal 
Code were prot ec ted from unconst itut ionality by t he same Constitut ion, that 
he had acted in t e rms of , and in conformity with, the Criminal Code, a nd 
that therefore his behaviour could not possibly be in violation of the Constitu-
tion (although there is a passing re ference to this subsec tion in the first court's 
judgement 41 ). This line of argument had been upheld by Her Majesty 's Consti-
tutiona l Court in Il- Pulizija v. Francesco Certo et. 42 decided in 1968 -- and 
in numerous cases since -- a lt hough in the Cer t o case the le gal issue involved 
was one of c ri minal procedure rathe r than substantive c rimina l law. Why 
did Balzan not invoke the notorious s.48(7) as a main plea? One possible reason 
is that respondent's counsel as well as the first court may have entertained 
the view tha t the term "public orde r" a s used in the Constit ution has exactly 
the same meaning as t he phrase "public orde r and peace" in s.358(1) and "public 
good order or the public peace" in s.352(bb) of the Crimina l Code (and possibly 
also the same meaning as "the public peace" in ss.395(1) and 396 -- the "binding 
over" sec tions of our Cr iminal Code). If t hat were so, it would obviously 
have been supe r fluous to invoke s.48(7); if the Inspector's behaviour was neces-
sary to preserve public orde r and peace in line with his dut y unde r t he C riminal 
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Code, then it was also reasonably required in the interests of public order 
under the Constitution 4 3; if it was not necessary to preserve public order 
and peace, it went outside the ambit of s.358(1), outside the ambit of the 
Criminal Code, and was therefore not done under the authority of the said 
Code and consequently was not covered by s.48(7). To add to the difficulty 
of this convoluted argument the first court said: 
Kif gie rilevat !'/Cwwa fin-rota ta' J--a;servazzjonijiet tar-rikorrent il-kwistjoni (Ii 
intant, pero', xorta warda tibqa spiruza) tirrisolvi nJtia filli jigi deteminat safejn 
il-liberta' ta' l-espressjoni ta' 1-individwu tista' tigi cirkoskritta rrill-esigenzi tal-ordni 
pli:'bliku -- f'lierra limiti biss 1-ordnijiet imiffrmija fil-precitati artikoli 352(cc) u 
361 tal-Kodici Kriminali jistgru jitqie9..J .legittiTi 44. 
Let me attempt to paraphrase. S.352(cc) of the Cr iminal Code provides that 
whoever disobeys the lawful orders of any authori t y or of any person entrusted 
with a public service is guilty of a contravention. S.361 provides that every 
police officer may proceed to the arrest of any person who knowingly, or 
after due warning, disobeys his lawful orders. Now the first cour t, in the 
paragraph just quoted, seems to be saying that an order is lawful, at least 
when that order as a matter of fact amounts to an interference with the free-
dom of expression, only if it is reasonably required in the interests of public 
order. It is submitted that whereas this is correct as regards the arrest under 
s.361 -- any other interpretation would mean that virtually no arrest by the 
police can ever be illegal because the police would simply preface t he arrest 
with any prima facie lawful order which they know will not be obeyed -- the 
same cannot be said with regards to s.352(cc). 
LAWFUL POLICE ORDERS 
In protecting the provisions of the Criminal Code from unconstitutionality, 
s.48(7) also protects the interpretation given to those provisions prior to the 
coming into force of the Constitution. After all, the interpretation of a pro-
vision of law is nothing more than an explanation or exposition of the true 
purport of that provision (usually by reference to the presumed intention of 
the legislator) and must be held to be an integral part of that prov1s1on of 
law. Our courts, Jong before the coming into force of the Constitution, had 
interpreted the meaning of "lawful police orders" in s.352(cc) of the Criminal 
Code and the advent of the Constitution did not change that interpretation. 
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One of the earliest reported "lawful orders" cases dates back to 190845. 
Thirty-one bandsmen tunefully playing in Casal Qormi were ordered by the 
police to stop playing their instruments. They refused to stop playing. From 
the Jaw report it is not clear why the police gave the order or what was the 
occasion or event at which the bandsmen were playing. The court found them 
guilty of failing to obey the lawful orders of the police. They appealed since 
they maintained that the police order was not lawful and that they were there-
fore not bound to obey it, but the appellate court upheld the conviction; the 
court held that even if the order was not lawful, provided it was an order 
within the competence of the police and regular in form, the bandsmen had 
to obey it and then seek redress elsewhere. The court also held that t he compe-
tence of the police to give a partic ular order must be presumed by the person 
to whom the order is directed. It is worth quoting the relevant part of this 
judgement: 
Atteso che arrressa p..re per ipotesi l'illegittimita' di qt.ello ordine, essencb esso 
stesso di carpetenza deUa Polizia e regolare neUa forrra, i citati nelle circcstanze 
indicate nei rrotivi prerressi aUa sentenz.a appeUata, p..r senterd:x"le l'ingiustizia, 
dovevaro ubbidire salvo ii ricorso contro l'intrinsica ingiustizia. Ca;i' Silvio Lcrghi 
deUa resistenza legittirra agli atti dell'Autorita' p.106-137 ove cita ii Rcrragrosi 
e distir@.E ii diritto di resistenza da qr.Jello di rifiutare t.bbidienza, Gip.V,112-113; 
veda.5i pcre ii Viazzi delle contrawenzimi p.90, ii qua.le sotto la nhrica "legalita' 
dell'ordine'' dice, l'ordine "dev'essere dato legarrente''. Giova tuttavia notare che 
qualt..nque ordine dato dall'autorita' (e la carpetenza si deve serrpre presi...ppore) 
per ragione (e non per pretesti) di giustizia e di pt.bblica sia.rezz.a, e' Lil ordine 
dato legalrrente. 46 
This interpretation of what constitutes a "lawful order" was upheld by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in the case Il-PuJizija v. Carmelo Bonello decided 
in 194247, and in 19 59 by Mr. Justice Harding in Il-Pulizija v. Eugenio Sciber-
48 ras In this last mentioned case, the court, after quoting with approval 
the dictum that "quando un ordine della Polizia e' di competenza della s tessa 
e regolare nella for ma, deve essere ubbidito, salvo ii ricorso contro l' intrinsica 
(in)giustizia", added: 
lzda, awar1i dan il-principju, din il-Q:rt.i rra hix affattu iri<linata li tghid li kien 
hemn xi haga illegittirra, jew arbitrarja, fl-ordni rroghti mis-strgent Micallef. ll-
kurpless tal-provi pjutta;t juri li z-zewg drivers kienu qegt-din jirkap:nixxu n.ttun, 
ghad-darn.i tad-disbrig norrrali tat-traffiku, u ju-i wkoll li dak 1-<rdni kien 1-aktar 
soluzzjcni prattika ghaU--evenjenza ta' dak il-mrrent; tant li, b'rraruvra facli u spedi-
ta, it-traffiku gie distrikat. 49 
There is one apparently conflic ting judgement, La Polizia v. Nobile Conte 
Francesco Palermo Navarra Bonici50 . This judgement is however reconcileable 
with Formosa, Bonello a nd Sciberras on the basis that in the Bonici case the 
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court went for the intrinsic lawfulness of the order, and did not limit itself 
to its prima facie lawfulness. It held that the order was intrinsically lawful 
because it was given "dall'autorita' per ragione di giustizia e di pubblica sicu-
rezza". Of course, if apart from reasons of public safety the police are express-
ly authorised by a particular provision of law to give certain specific type 
of orders, those orders would likewise be intrinsically, as opposed to merely 
prima facie, lawful 51 . 
The two requisites, therefore, for a "lawful police order" giving rise to the 
corresponding duty of obedience to that order are (A) that it should be an 
order within the competence of the police -- and there is a presumption that 
every order is within the competence of the police. This presumption may 
of course be rebutted if the order is manifestly illegal and therefore could 
not possibly be within the competence of the police -- for instance an order 
to beat up somebody or to run stark naked in the street. The second requisite 
(B) is that the order must be "regular in form", that is delivered in a normal 
and regular manner. An order accompanied by blows or punches or with the 
use of threatening or obscene words would obviously not be regular in form. 
So also if the order is given in ambiguous terms or in unintelligible language. 
Even if the order is intrinsically illegitimate or unlawful, that is, not warranted 
by law, it would still be prima facie lawful for the purpose of s.352(cc) if 
"within the competence of the police" and "regular in form". Thus, for in-
stance, I decide to go and stand next to a ruinous and dangerous portico; a 
police constable, fearing for my safety, orders me to move along. I refuse. 
He may arrest me and the court will no doubt convict me under s.352(cc). 
But the police have no general duty to look after my individual safety in such 
circumstances, my personal or individual safety hardly qualifying as the public 
safety. Nor would injury to myself cause, under normal circumstances, public 
disorder. S.4 of the Malta Police Ordinance, 1961, provides that the Police 
Force shall be used, inter alia, for the protection of life and property, but 
that section does not impose a duty, much less confer a power, with regard 
to my individual safety. could therefore repay the thoughtful constable 
by bringing an action for illegal arrest. Likewise it would seem that there 
is no positive duty on the police to prevent a person from committing suicide 
if in the process there is no danger to the life, health or property of the public 
and no danger of public disorder. 
Now, from the evidence tendered in Calleja v. Balzan there is nothing to indi-
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cate that the Inspector's orders to Monsignor Calleja to remove the posters 
were not prima facie lawful as above described. They were intrinsically unlaw-
ful for another reason (which shall be examined shortlv) but prima facie they 
were lawful. The Monsignor could have been charged under s.352(cc). But 
what if the Inspector had proceeded to arrest the Monsignor? Would the arrest 
have been illegal? It is submitted that if the Inspector's orders were not 
necessary to preserve public order and peace in terms of s.358(1) of the Crimin-
al Code or were not dictated by sound reasons of public safety (pubblica sicu-
rezza) then the arrest would have been illegal under the Criminal Code and 
consequently under the Constitution. But in this case there was no arrest 
whether out of indecision, out of respect for the cloth or out of knowledge 
of the subtle legal issues involved -- but only the removal or the grabbing 
of the posters. 
It is further submitted that the correct analytical approach to the legal issue 
raised in Calleja v. Balzan should have been the following: 
A Were In.<pector Balz.an's actims (tre order to rerove, and tre reroval of, tre 
posters) crmJ)tirg to interfererce with freeckm of expres.sim necessary to preserve 
public order and peace and to prevent tre carmissioo of any offerce as was ina.m-
bent oo him in terrrs of s.358(1) of tre 0-iminal Ox!e? 
B. If in tre affirrrative, then what he did was dooe mder tre auth:rity of tre 0-m-
nal Ox!e and was not LJ'Cffi5titutiooal in view of s.48(7) of tre Cmstituticn; 
C If in tre negative, then ~cr Baiz.an was not acting mder tre authcrity of 
tre co±; it would then be necessary to examine whether he was acting mder tre 
authcrity of sore other law or provisioo of law reascn.Ely req..iired in tre interests 
of public order and, finally, whether that other provisioo of law and tre ~·s 
behaviour in coofoonity thereto were reascn.Ely justifiable in a denx:ratic society. 
Inspector Balzan, however, did not attempt to justify his actions other than 
under the Criminal Code. 
The words "public order" have a popular, apart from a legal, meaning. In 
lay language they simply mean the absence of disorder, and are therefore 
almost synonymous with orderly and more or less predictable way of life -
essential services functioning, motor traffic flowing along, people going about 
their day to day affairs without undue rush, and when many people have to 
make use of the same service, be it a bus or the public convenience, they 
queue up like good Englishmen, even if under the sweltering Maltese sun -
in short the absence of confusion and pandemonium. As a phrase, "public 
order" is never used in contradistinction to "private order". Unlike "public 
interest" or "public niusance", the element of publicity in "public order" is 
subsumed in the term itself. English courts have occasionally attempted to 
determine the element of publicity in other phrases, but never, it would seem 
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in the phrase "public order". Thus in R.v. Sussex Confirming Authority, ex 
p. Tamplin & Sons' Brewery (Brighton), Ltd. 52 the court held: 
It is fallacirus to say that a cooditim (attadled to a justices' licerce) is rot in the 
public interest, or TIBy rot be in the public interest, if it is the case that a great 
TIBny of tffise persons who cmstitute the public are rot directly affected by it; 
and it is ecµilly fallacirus to say that a cmditim carTOt be in the pj:>lic interest 
if a great TIBnY rrarbers of the pj:>lic reither know nor care anything abrut it.(53) 
Or take the case of public niusance in English law. How many people must 
be inconvenienced before the public can be said to be inconvenienced? Lord 
Denning: 
.... I decline to answer the questim how TIBny JJeq)le are necessary to make ~ I-ff 
Majesty's s.Jbjects generally. I prefer to look to the reasm of the thing and to say 
that a p..blic niusance is a niusance Vvhidl is so widespread in its range or so indis-
criminate in its effect that it would rot be reasmable to expect me person to take 
proceedings m his own resp:nsibility to put a stq:i to it, but that it srruld be taken 
on the responsibility of the cxrrmnity at large. 54 
55 In R. v. Madden the Court of Criminal Appeal held that in orc~er to prove 
the offence of public niusance (by making a bogus telephone call falsely giving 
information about a bomb) it had to be shown that the public, that is to say, 
a considerable number of persons, or a section of the public, as distinct from 
individual persons, had actually been effected; and one of the reasons for allow-
ing the appeal and quashing the conviction was precisely because there was 
no evidence that a considerable number of persons had been affected: it was 
not possible for a jury, properly directed, to have arrived at the conclusion 
that a considerable number of persons were affected by the action of the appel-
lant. More recently, in R. v. Norbury, the Norwich Crown Court upheld an 
indictment for public niusance against a person who on more than six hundred 
occasions made obscene telephone calls to over four hundred women "intending 
to cause offence and alarm and resulting in such offence and alarm" to them 56. 
But when it comes to "public order", English judges and lawyers have steered 
clear of any definition. The English attitude is simply to enumerate the various 
nominate offences -- usually characterised by the quantitative element of more 
than one person and the qualitative element of violence -- which the particular 
author considers to be crimes against public order 57 . Likewise our Criminal 
Code enumerates, under the general subtitle of "Contraventions Affecting Public 
Order" a host of acts or omissions, many of which, however, are not attended 
with either numbers or violence: for example, cutting grass in a fortification58, 
59 
or refusing to receive at the established value money lawfully current , or 
wearing a mask in a public place GO, or leading an idle and vagrant life 61 . 
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On the other hand some of the "Contraventions Against the Person" entail 
a certain quantum of violence: for instance, the contravention of pushing a ny 
person in the street with the object of hurting or insulting him 62. 
One of the contraventions agains t public order consists in disturbing the public 
good order or the public peace in any manner not otherwise provided for in 
the Criminal Code -- s.352(bb), already referred to. Here the phrases "public 
good order" and "public peace" are used interchangeably, and appear to have 
a peculiar and very specific meaning. 
THE BISHOP BESIEGED 
One of the oldest reported cases which gives an explanation of the words "public 
good order (and) public peace" (ii buon ordine (e) la tranquillita' pubblica) is 
lspettore Raffaele Calleja v. Paolo Bugeja et.63 decided in 1890 by Sir Adrian 
Dingli. The facts of the case were the following: 
••• .U"B gran folla capitanata da Paolo Bugeja, Paolo Azz.cpardi, e Luigi Bugeja (cwel-
lanti) rrosse dal Rabato deUa f\btabile a quella Gtta', e si fenro' irranzi al Palazzo 
Vesmvile, rrentre ii Vesmvo si preparava a partire per la Valletta. •• ved.rta quella 
folla, Giovami lvWlia, chrestico de! VenJvo, tento' di chil..00-e la pcrta, ma fu irrpe-
dito rciocipalmnte dal detto Luigi Bugeja e da Gaetano Velia (altro cweJ!ante), i 
quali dicevano di volere entrare per parlare al Vesmvo...in m istante, lo ~ tra 
ii portcne de! palazzo e l'antiporta si errpi' di gente che L:ceva rcessa verso l'intemo 
ove era la carrozz.a in ~ttaz.ime de! Vesmvo. . .si gridava ''Vogliaro sapere perche' 
ii Ve:c:ovo ha licenziato i Santesi"; ''Vogliaro soddisfazime"; 'l'\hl urirete di cµ, 
rrn L&:i.rete rc.irra di darci r~'· In quel prnto si i:resento' ii Virario, ii q.iale 
scerdeva le scale acccrrpagnan:b ii Vesmvo, e ii detto Paolo Bugeja gli di.sse: 'N:>i 
vi abbiaro fatto ricco, roi vi abbiaro fatto ri5pettabile (nies), ii Vesmvo e' m .. -." 
t.r.iCICrl> q.ii s:nifosissrre parole occcrrpagnate cm ma bestermia...la folla intanto 
spirgeva irranzi, malgracb gli sfcrzi dello Isrettcre Raffaele Calleja per irrpedirla; 
i detti Luigi Bugeja e Gaetano Vella e Paolo f\zzq)ardi (altro cweJ!ante) cmtiruavaro 
ad avanz.are rrrostante ii divieto de! Ve:c:ovo, gridarrl:>: "In S. Paolo rrn entri nesuio, 
perche' roi a:mnandiaro, la chiesa e' raitra" e batterm colle rrani sullo spcrtello 
deUa carrozz.a ove ii Ve:c:ovo era gia entrato...il Virario sgricb' la folla, chiederdo 
nello s1:eS$) tffTµ> allo Isrettcre di rcen:Jere rota dei rx:mi dei c.ai:rrirni per citarli ... 
accordato poi ii perrresso a q..iattro irdividui di parlare al VenJvo, e, data irdi dal 
Vicario infOOTBZicre alla folla, che i Santesi sarebbero rirasti ai k:ro posti firo a 
n..ovo crdine, i dam:re cessarcrD, a st.ggerirento de! Virario rredesirro, si d:rrancb' 
srusa al VenJvo, e la folla u:;ci' dal Palazzo, gridarrl> e batterrl> le rrani. 64 
Neither the Bishop nor the Vicar or the domestic were in any way injured or 
physically assaulted. Sir Adrian held that there was a disturbance of public 
good order and the public peace, because every act which induces apprehension 
for the safety of the public in general or of individuals in particular is an act 
done in breach of public order and the public peace "indipendentemente della 
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perpetrazione di altro reato". Safety must here be understood as absence of 
injury from violent behaviour. It does not take much to see the similarity 
between this exposition of our law and the notion of "breach of the peace" 
in English law. 
The term "breach of the peace" is one of the most elusive terms in English 
criminal law. A breach of the peace is not (in England) a substantive offence 
but confers certain common law powers of arrest. Professor Glanville Williams 
considers that the general meaning of the concept of "breach of the peace" 
is an act involving danger to the person 65. In so far as it means "a breach 
of the Queen's peace" it should, strictly speaking, include every crime. The 
concept of breach of the peace in England has a related yet somewhat distinct 
branch dealing with instances of public violence, that is, acts in terrorem populi, 
such as the common law offences of affray, unlawful assembly and riot: offences 
which in our Criminal Code are found in the title dealing with crimes against 
the public peace. Indeed, the crimes dealt with in sections 63 to 82A of our 
Criminal Code constitute, for the most part, also a disturbance of public good 
order and the public peace, s.352(bb) apparently being left to deal with such 
disturbances of a less serious nature which do not fall specifically under any 
of these or any other sections. Going armed in public is not of itself a breach 
of the peace in English law, although the circumstances may be such as to 
create a reasonable apprehension of danger on the part of others and therefore 
constitute a breach of the peace or even possibly an unlawful assembly. A 
degree of disturbance which might result from disorderly conduct, abusive lan-
guage, excessive noise and so on will not necessarily constitute a breach of 
the peace unless there is reasonable cause for apprehending a threat or use 
of force. Conduct which is annoying but which involves neither menace, vio-
lence, the threat of violence or any element of incitement to violence does 
not constitute a breach of the peace. So also disorder which is superficial 
or self-contained and which contains no real danger to others does not amount 
to a breach of the peace. An English case, Wooding v. Oxley66, decided in 
1839, would seem to hold that heckling at a public meeting is not, per se, 
conduct which would justify an arrest for breach of the peace -- possibly because 
heckling is a time-honoured practice at public meetings in England. In the 
case Amabile Schembri v. Giuseppe Bartolo67 heckling at public meetings was 
also held to be a legitimate practice in Malta, provided that the signs and 
sounds of approval or disapproval of what the speaker is saying do not degene-
rate into personal violence "o minaccia all'ordine pubblico". And in this parti-
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cular case Mr. Justice (later Sir) Arturo Mercieca went on to say that the 
hiring of a large number of persons from lower and violent classes for the 
purpose of disturbing the speakers, not by counter argument, questions or mere 
heckling, but by shouting, squawking (schiamazzi) and threatening violence 
such as to induce fear in the speaker and his audience, amounted to a distur-
bance of public order. 
Shouting loudly in the street or blowing a horn do not amount to a breach of 
the peace at English common law. This point was taken up in 11-Pulizija v. 
Paul Montebello68 where the court drew a sharp distinction between the contra-
vention contemplated in s.352(m) (disturbing at night time the repose of the 
inhabita nts by rowdiness, bawling or in any other manner) a nd that contemplated 
in s.352(bb). 
Repeated pestering of a young woman does not constitute a breac h of the peace 
in English law unless the woman goes about in fear of personal violence by 
reason of the threats made by the pe rson compla ined of: the re must be, in 
other words, an element of threat or menace, whether by words, gestures or 
conduct69. It must be noted that in Scotland, where breach of the peace is 
a substantive offence, the notion is wider than in England because it also inc -
ludes, apart from threats against personal safety, also breac hes of public deco-
70 rum. Thus in the Scots case Raffaeli v. Heatly the ac t ivity of a "peeping 
Tom" was he ld to amount to a breach of t he peace in the absence of any threats 
of violence or menace; and more recently, in 1977, a case was reported in 
The Guardian71 where a youth was found guilty by a Sheriff's Court in Glasgow 
of breach of the peace for persistently following and staring at girl students 
over a pe riod of fourteen months. 
The latest, and perhaps most authoritative, definition of what amounts to a 
breach of the peace in English law was laid down in R. v. Howell72: 
We are errboldened to say that there is a bream of the peace whenever harm is 
actually dcne cr is likely to be dcne to a persm cr in his i:x-esence to his (X"cperty 
cr a persm is in fear of beirg 9;) harrred 1huJgh an assault, an affray, a riot, an 
ll1iawful ~ly or other distu-barce. 73 
The equation of "disturbance of public good order or the public peace" in s.352 
(bb) with "breac h of the peace" as understood in English law seems to-day to 
be settled law: the point was made quite clear in 1954 in the case 11-Pulizija 
v. Carmela Scinto et.74 . It is further supported by a number of case/ 5, decided 
in 1958 and 1959, which dealt with s.6(l)(b) of the Prese rvation of Public Orde r 
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Emergency Ordinance, 195876. The relevant part of this section read: 
My perscn \lko._.carl.x:ts hirTself in a rramer likely to cause a l:readl of the i:;eace, 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
The words "breach of the peace" in this section were given the same interpreta-
tion as "disturbing the public good order or the public peace" by our courts. 
But the Emergency Ordinance had the additional words "likely to cause". In 
other words it was sufficient, as was held in 11-Pulizija v. William Allen77 that 
there was a "probability" (which the court equated with "reasonable anticipa-
tion") of a breach of the peace: e ven if the breach of the peace had not ac-
tually occurred, there was nonetheless a substantive offence under this section 
of the Emergency Ordinance if the individual's behaviour was likely, in the 
circumstances, to lead to a breach of the peace. A thing is likely to happen 
78 when there are reasonable probabilities that it will happen But "likely" 
can also mean "such as might well happen". In a New Zealand case it was 
held that "the meaning to be given to the word 'likely' where it is used in 
a statute or regulation will depend upon the statute or regulation and the con-
text in which the word is used1179. On the other hand s.352(bb) requires an 
actual breach of the peace, although for an actual breach of the peace it is 
sufficient that there be reasonable apprehension of danger to the safety of 
one or more individuals or of his or their property, the danger arising, as has 
already been said, from viole nce or threats of violence. 
THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS 
The words "public peace" as used in ss.395(1) and 396 of the C riminal Code 
have been given a slightly wider interpretation than "public good order or the 
public peace" in s.352(bb). In La Polizia v. Emmanuela Vella80 it was held 
that 
--le due di5posizi<ni (395(1) and 3%) hanno per fine principale quello di irrpedire 
la vicina ripetizicre di reati cne attacc.ano la sicurezza individ.Jale ed ii bu:n crdine 
p.bblico, avuto riguardo alle particolari circostanz.e de! ~ ed alla cmcbtta dell' 
irTputato. 81 
But Vella had been bound ove r to keep the peace not because of any violent 
behaviour or disposition on her part but because she had been found guilty 
of holding lotteries without police permission. The appellate court held: 
Attesocche' le lotterie al prirro estratto senza penrero della Polizia e quindi senza 
controllo scro divenute rrolto estese e frequenti e spesso scro occasioni di frodi e 
causa di litigi chrestici e di rovina di farriglie p:>vere, onde, anche se la condotta 
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della ilµ.rtata rcn fa;;se essa stessa m rrotivo che avesse detenninato la prirra arte 
a dare il detto provvedirrento in aggimta ail'arrrrenda, lo stesso sarellie stato giusti-
ficato. 82 
Our courts have also had occasion to interpret the phrase "offence affecting 
public order" in s.537(d) and in the provisos to ss.538 and 385 of the Criminal 
Code. Unfortunately all the reported cases are instances of defilement of 
minors, rape or violent indecent assault committed in a public place or in a 
place accessible to the public, and it is precisely this place of commission 
of the principal offence which has been held to be the criterion determining 
the additional offence ("accompanying" offence) affecting public order83. 
To sum up, therefore, it would seem that broadly speaking the term "public 
order and peace" as used in the Criminal Code84 means the absence of danger 
to the safety of individuals or to the safety of property as well as the absence 
of reasonable apprehension of such danger, the danger arising from violence, 
or from threats of violence, or from some other disturbance or state of fac ts. 
Now s.358(1) imposes upon the police the duty to preserve public order and 
peace (in effect to prevent a breach of the peace before it is committed) as 
well as to prevent the commission of all other offences, whether crimes or 
contraventions. But such preventive action must, in the light of all the circum-
stances, including the behaviour complained of, be reasonable by the standards 
of the Criminal Code. And what is reasonable is what is objectively reasonable, 
not what the police officer on the spot, subjectively, and on the spur of the 
moment may think is reasonable. This concept is fundamental to a proper 
understanding of police powers, particularly the power of arrest; it is also a 
fundamental concept in any free soc ie ty. Thus, s.359 authorises the polic e 
to arrest a person who is suspected of having committed a crime punishable 
with imprisonment. Properly understood that section should read "who is reason-
ably suspected of having committed a crime punishable with imprisonment" 
(with the exception of crimes punishable under the Press Act, 1974). And what 
is reasonable is not necessarily what the policeman on the spot may think is 
reasonable; his conclusion may be the result of excitement, fear, inexperience 
or an exceptionally fertile imagination. The policeman's judgement is always 
subject to review by the court85 which must apply objective standards: 
\\!hat is wanted is that 1he cirrunstan::es of the case be 9Jil that a reasa1able rran 
~ wifu.rt passim ex prejudice woold fairly have suspected 1he persm of hav~ 
ccnmitted 1he offen::e. It is irrportant that hasty ex ill c:Wi5ed police acticn srruld 
be avoided. If, en 1he other hard, 1he police hesitate too la-g to arrest a persm 
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when tr-.ey have a !XqJff ard sufficient grund of susp1C1a1 against him, they rray 
kx:re ti1e q:ip:rttnity of arrestifll; him or enable him to d:stroy evidffice. 86 
And this was the fundamental mistake in the first court's judgement in Calleja 
v. Balzan, that is in giving preference to the subjective assessment of the situa-
tion made by Inspector Balzan over the objective assessment resulting from 
the evidence. The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, went for objective 
reasonableness. 
Now, did the Monsignor's actions in displaying the posters amount to a breach 
of the peace? Certainly not: his actions were neither violent or menacing, 
nor could they, per se, inspire fear for one's personal safety or the safety of 
87 
property . 
Was Inspector Balzan's interference (the orders to remove the posters, and 
the removal of the poster from the Monsignor's hands) reasonable by the stan-
dards of the Criminal Code? In other words, were his actions reasonably neces-
sary to prevent a breach of the peace or the commission of some other offence? 
The answer again is in the negative. If a breach of the peace was reasonably 
expected, the remote cause was the Monsignor's behaviour but the immediate " 
cause was the threatening behaviour of those people who wanted 10 stop the 
- - f 
Monsignor from expressing his view. To hold otherwise would be tantamount 
to saying that any peaceful and essentially lawful activity may be suppressed 
because somebody else decides to behave violently or unlawfully in respect 
of that activity thereby creating a breach of the peace. Clearly this would 
amount to a gross subversion of the basic principle of freedom upon which 
the Criminal Code itself is founded. A peaceful and lawful activity does not 
become unlawful or merit suppression because of the violent and unlawful acti-
vity of others; if at all, it is those others which must be restrained, and the 
activity of those others which must be suppressed. Needless to say, it is con-
ceivable, in extremis, that the police, having done their utmost to prevent 
those others from disrupting a lawful activity, find that the situation has gone 
out of hand and that the only way of preventing the commission of more serious 
offences, is to suppress also the lawful act1v1ty. But Inspector Balzan was 
in no way faced with a hopeless or out of hand situation. It does not seem 
that he had used all the authority at his disposal such as summoning more 
policemen to be stationed near the Monsignor -- to prevent a breach of the 
peace or the commission of more serious offences by those who, it was clear, 
did not share the Monsignor's views. Instead he took the short cut, and attemp-
33 
ted to stop the Monsignor. This was unreasonable by the standards of the Crimi-
nal Code, was therefore not done under the authority of that law and conse-
quently was unconstitutional. 
The unenviable situation in which Inspector Balzan found himself was, of course, 
not novel. Way back in 1882 the Salvation Army, whic h preached temperance, 
met at Weston-super-Mare, England, with the knowledge that they would be 
opposed by the Skeleton Army, an organisation financed partly by brewery 
owners and who had made it a habit of disrupting the meetings of the Salvation 
Army. The magistrates put out a notice forbidding the Salvation Army's meet-
ing. The Salva tionists, however, assembled, were met by the police and told 
to obey the notic e. One of the members declined to obe y and was arrested. 
He was subsequently, with others, convicted by the magistrates of taking part 
in an unlawful assembly. It was an undoubted fact that the meeting of the 
Salvation Army was likely to lead to an attack by the Skeleton Army and in 
this sense cause a breach of the peac e. The convic tion by the magistrates 
was quashe d on appeal t o the Queen's Bench Division: 
What has happened here is that an l111awful organisation (the Skeleton Arrcy) has 
as9.ITed to itself the right to prevent the awellants and others fran lawfully ~ 
blirg together, and the findirg of the justi:es aroJlts to this, that a rran rray be 
convicted for doirg a lawful act if he knows that his doirg it rray cause another 
to do an l111awful act. There is no ai..rttn-ity for s.d1 a prqxlSition. 88 
The principle expressed in this case wa s taken up in an Irish case, R. v. Justices 
89 of Londonderry : 
l\\rh has been said on oo1h sides in the cn.rse of the argurent al::o.rt the case of 
Beatty v. Qlhli<s. I cm not s.re that I wruld have taken the scrre view of the 
facts of that case as was ~ted by the Ccut that decided it< but I agree wi1h 
oo1h the law as laid cbwn by the ~ and their application of it to the facts 
as they t.n:lerstocd th:rn. The principle Lnderlyirg the ckision seEIT5 to rre to be 
that an act irnx:ent in itself, d:ne wi1h irnx:ent intent, and reasmably irridental 
to the perforrrarce of a cirty, to the carryirg of a business, to the enjoyment of 
legitirate recreation, or generally to the exercise of a legal right, does not bea:rre 
crininal because it rray provd<e perscns to break the peace, or otherwise to o:rdu:t 
them;elves in an illegal way. 90 
And another judge, in the same case , observed: 
If darger arises fran the exercise of lawful rights resultirg in a breach of the peace, 
the rerredy is the presen::e of sufficient force to prevent that result, not the legal 
cm:::lermation of th:re wro exercise th:re rights. 91 
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